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Abstract. Using a sample of prime-aged men from the German Socio-Economic Panel (GSOEP),
this paper examines the eﬀects of past poverty experience on future poverty status, future employ-
ment status and household composition. The empirical results suggest that even after controlling
for observed and unobserved characteristics, past poverty experience increases the poverty risk of
future periods. Moreover, there is evidence that experiencing poverty has a negative eﬀect on future
employment behaviour and on household cohesion. Apart from its economic signiﬁcance, the exi-
stence of such feedback eﬀects is interesting from an econometric point of view, as they represent
a violation of the strict exogeneity assumption, which is usually invoked in estimating dynamic
qualitative response models with unobserved heterogeneity.
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It is a well-established ﬁnding that individuals who experience poverty are more likely to
experience poverty in future periods. In principle, such a relationship may be due to two
fundamentally diﬀerent mechanisms. The ﬁrst possibility is that individuals who are poor
in one period are so because they have characteristics that make them particularly poverty-
prone. This might be observed characteristics such as low endowments of human capital,
unemployment, health problems or diﬃcult living arrangements, or typically unobserved
factors such as low intelligence, lack of abilities, low levels of motivation or unfavorable
general attitudes. To the extent that these characteristics persist over time, they will also
increase the poverty risk of future periods, creating a spurious relationship between current
and future poverty.
The alternative possibility is that the poverty experience of one period has a genuine
causal eﬀect on future poverty (this is usually called the state dependence eﬀect). There are
a number of diﬀerent mechanisms that might explain such a causal eﬀect. A ﬁrst example is
that low income may be associated with adverse incentives which make it unworthwhile for
the individual to take up a job if unemployed, or even to keep a low-paid job if employed (the
so-called poverty trap). This is a realistic possibility in countries with a minimum-income
guarantee such as Germany, where unemployed individuals near the minimum-income level
face excessive marginal tax and transfer burdens when they increase their earnings over this
minimum level. Another channel through which a poverty experience may increase the risk
of future poverty is if it is connected to processes of demoralization, loss of motivation or
depreciation of human capital, which make it less likely that the individual takes up a job
if unemployed, or which may lead to a series of low quality jobs or unstable employment,
increasing in turn the risk of remaining in or returning to poverty. A similar mechanism is
at work if the experience of low income or the feeling of social exclusion leads to problems
with alcohol or other drugs, or more generally to health problems, which typically make it
diﬃcult to remain gainfully employed. In a similar way, a poverty experience may also be
associated with a change in the living milieu and an increase in ’bad’ contacts which may have
detrimental eﬀects on the quality of job opportunities, or which may lead to participation
in a ’culture of dependency’, where welfare receipt is the accepted way of living. Finally,
having to live on low ﬁnancial means may strain marriages or cohabitative relationships and
1possibly increase the probability of a household split, which in turn will lead to higher poverty
risks if household economies-of-scale are destroyed or if work incentives are diminished by
maintenance payments.
The channels through which possible causal eﬀects from current to future poverty work
are also interesting from an econometric point of view. If eﬀects of poverty on future poverty
are investigated using dynamic qualitative response models, and if these eﬀects are mediated
through feedback between poverty status and observed variables included as regressors in the
model, then this represents a violation of the strict exogeneity assumption usually invoked in
estimating such models (see Arellano/Honor´ e (2001) and Honor´ e (2002) for an overview). In
the present context this concerns in particular feedback from poverty to employment status,
and from poverty to household composition.
The distinction between poverty persistence due to individual heterogeneity as opposed
to poverty persistence due to a causal eﬀect of current on future poverty has important policy
implications. If poverty causes new poverty independently of other causes, then poverty-
ﬁghting policies will have a much more profound impact, as not only current poverty but
also future poverty is avoided. On the other hand, if there is evidence that poverty has a
tendency to reproduce itself then existing policies will have to be checked to what extent
they might be a part of such a mechanism. For example, it will have to be examined if
adverse incentives prevent low income individuals from taking up a job or whether generous
welfare payments lead to a ’culture of dependency’.
Using data from the German Socio-Economic Panel (GSOEP), the aim of this paper
is to examine the causal eﬀects of current on future poverty, explicitly considering possible
feedback between poverty status, employment status and household composition. After re-
viewing dynamic binary response models which are in principle suited to study the question,
and after discussing the role of the strict exogeneity assumption, a joint dynamic model
of poverty, employment status and household composition based on an idea by Wooldridge
(2000) is developed and estimated. The results suggest that (i) even after controlling for dif-
ferently speciﬁed observed and unobserved individual heterogeneity there are causal eﬀects
from current to future poverty, that (ii) experiencing poverty decreases employment proba-
bilities and increases the probability of living in a one-person-household in future periods,
and that (iii), in the presence of such feedback eﬀects, models based on the strict exogeneity
2assumption may yield biased estimates of state dependence eﬀect.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In section 2, some related literature is
discussed. Section 3 reviews dynamic binary response models based on the strict exogeneity
assumption and develops a model explicitly allowing for feedback eﬀects. Section 4 discusses
the data used to estimate this model. The estimation results are presented in section 5, while
section 6 concludes the paper.
2 Related literature
Starting with Heckman (1978, 1981a, 1981b) researchers have been asking the question whe-
ther observed persistence in economic phenomena is due to underlying diﬀerences in indivi-
dual characteristics or due to genuine causal eﬀects of past on future outcomes. A prominent
example is the question of whether past unemployment causes future unemployment as stu-
died for example by Flaig et al. (1993), M¨ uhleisen/Zimmermann (1994) and Arulampalam
et al. (2000). Another example is persistence in low pay, which has been considered, among
others, by Stewart/Swaﬃeld (1999), Weber (2002) and Stewart (2004). In most of the cited
articles, dynamic discrete choice models with unobserved heterogeneity based on the strict
exogeneity assumption are used to distinguish the eﬀects of state dependence from observed
and unobserved heterogeneity. The assumption of no feedback from the dependent variable
on future values of the explanatory variables seems less problematic in these examples as the
latter variables are usually individual characteristics such as age or educational qualiﬁcations
that will not be altered by past outcomes of employment status or wages.2
The assumption of no feedback is much more problematic if one considers persistence
in phenomena such as poverty or welfare participation which depend on household variables
and employment decisions.3 Recent examples where models based on the strict exogeneity
assumption are used to study state dependence in this context are Chay/Hyslop (2000),
2More problematic are marital status and the number of children, as one might expect, for example,
negative eﬀects of low wages on marriage stability and fertility.
3Another example where allowing no feedback from the dependent variable to future explanatory variables
seems restrictive is health persistence as studied by Contoyannis et al. (2004). In their econometric speciﬁ-
cation, they implicitly assume that current health has no eﬀects on future income or household composition.
3Poggi (2003) and Gong (2004). For example, Chay/Hyslop (2000) ﬁt a number of alterna-
tive dynamic binary response models to labour force and welfare participation behaviour of
women in the United States. In their case, the inclusion of marriage status and the num-
ber of children in a model for welfare participation might be problematic as past welfare
participation may have eﬀects on future marital status and fertility. In a similar way, Poggi
(2003) studies persistence of social exclusion in Spain using a dynamic random eﬀects probit
model. Again, the inclusion of household type and employment dummies as regressors might
be problematic as experiencing social exclusion may lead to changes in living arrangements
or employment status. Finally, estimating a three-state dynamic multinomial logit model
with random eﬀects, Gong (2004) examines transition patterns for the welfare reliance of
low income mothers in Australia. In his example, the no-feedback assumption may also be
violated because some of the variables included as regressors, in particular the number of
children, whether the woman in question lives with a partner, and whether this partner also
relies on an income support payment, might depend on past welfare reliance.
A diﬀerent approach to estimating state dependence eﬀects in low income transitions
is taken by Cappellari/Jenkins (2002, 2003). They essentially adopt a pooled estimation
strategy which circumvents the strict exogeneity assumption. If one is not interested in the
nature and the direction of the possible feedback eﬀects, the pooled approach is a valid
method to examine state dependence eﬀects in the presence of unobserved heterogeneity.
Besides a number of advantages, it also has some disadvantages which will be discussed in
more detail below.
The present paper is also closely related to attempts of modelling poverty transiti-
ons in a more structural way undertaken by Burgess/Propper (1998), Burgess et al. (2002)
and Aassve et al. (2004). In these papers, poverty transitions are modelled as the result of
underlying transitions in economic and demographic variables such as employment, family
union and child bearing decisions, emphasizing their possible interrelatedness through opti-
mizing behaviour. Such an approach is in principle capable of incorporating feedback eﬀects
of past poverty status on future poverty, employment behaviour and household composition.
However, a direct econometric implementation including unobserved heterogeneity and cor-
relation of errors across the many processes considered seems diﬃcult and leads to similar
econometric problems as addressed by the strict exogeneity assumption. For example, in
4their empirical application Aassve et al. (2004) only model employment, family union and
childbearing decisions as being jointly determined. Income and poverty status are then deﬁ-
ned as a function of these variables. Feedback eﬀects of past income on employment, family
union and childbearing decisions, and direct eﬀects of past income on future income (state
dependence) are not allowed.
An alternative strategy to examining the eﬀects of past on future outcomes is the
duration or hazard framework (see e.g. Lancaster (1990)). In the presence of unobserved
heterogeneity, the estimation of hazard models with time-varying regressors may also require
a variant of the strict exogeneity assumption, ruling out certain relationships between the
dependent variable and future outcomes of the time-varying regressors (see e.g. Wooldridge
(2002b), section 20.4.3). This is also true of the simultaneous equations hazard approach of
Lillard (1993), which aims at modelling the dynamic interrelationship between two or more
duration variables. Even in this approach, it is implicitly assumed that the current hazard
rate of a given process is unrelated to future values of all the variables used as its regressors
(which may include present or past values of the other processes). In a recent application of
Lillard’s framework, Fitzgerald/Ribar (2003) jointly model transitions in and out of welfare
participation and female household headship. In their example, this assumption amounts to
assuming, for example, that the hazard of moving into female headship is unrelated to future
welfare participation.
3 Methods
3.1 Random eﬀects estimation
The ﬁrst approach to modelling the dynamics of individual poverty status considered in this
paper is a dynamic random eﬀects probit model (see e.g. Wooldridge (2002a)). If yit denotes
poverty status of individual i =1...N in period t =1...T then
yit =1{θ1yit−1 + θ2zit + ci + eit ≥ 0} (1)
(1{·} is the indicator function) describes the evolution of poverty conditional on i’s poverty
status in the previous period, a vector of exogenous variables zit and two unobservables ci
5and eit. The individual-speciﬁc term ci stands for all unobserved determinants of poverty
that are time-invariant for a given individual (in the sense that they do not change over the
sample period). In the poverty context these might be factors such as intelligence, ability,
motivation or general attitudes. The residual variation eit is idiosyncratic, and is assumed
to follow a standard normal distribution, i.e. eit ∼N(0,1).
Two issues need to be addressed when modelling cit. Firstly, unobserved factors such
as the ones mentioned above are likely to be correlated with the observed variables zit.F o r
example, intelligence may be correlated with the human capital acquired by the individual,
and the person’s motivation may be related to his or her employment status. Secondly, yi0,
i.e. the individual’s poverty status in the initial period, may also be correlated with the
factors captured by cit, as e.g. low intelligence or a lack of abilities will contribute to the risk
of being poor in t =0 .
Both of these aspects can be addressed by modelling the individual-speciﬁc term as
ci = α0 + α1yi0 + α2¯ zi + ai, (2)
where ¯ zi = T −1  T
t=1 zit denotes the time-average of the observed variables zit and ai ∼
N(0,σ2
a).4
In order to estimate the model by conditional maximum-likelihood methods, one has
to make the crucial assumption that
P (yit =1 |zi,y it−1,y it−2,...,y i0,c i)=P (yit =1 |zit,y it−1,c i)( 3 )
(strict exogeneity of zi,w h e r ezi summarizes the exogenous information (zi1,...,z iT)). This
assumption means that conditional on poverty status in the previous period and conditio-
nal on the unobserved individual-speciﬁc characteristics ci,p o v e r t yi np e r i o dt must not be
related to the value of the explanatory variables in past or in future periods. This requires
in particular that there must not be any feedback from poverty in period t to future values
of the explanatory variables. In the given context, this is likely to be unrealistic, as experi-
encing poverty in one period may possibly inﬂuence employment decisions or the household
4See Wooldridge (2002a). The usual way to account for the correlation between the initial condition yi0
and the individual speciﬁc eﬀect is to model the distribution of yi0 given ci and the exogenous information
(zi1,...,z iT) (see Heckman (1981c)). Wooldridge (2002a)’s approach serves the same purpose but is much
simpler.
6composition in future periods. We will relax the assumption of strict exogeneity and consider
these cases in more detail below. In addition, (3) also assumes that only the ﬁrst lag yit−1 is
relevant for poverty in period t.
Assumption (3) can then be used to obtain the density of (yi1,...,y iT) conditional on
the exogenous variables zi and on the individual eﬀect ci
f (yi1,...,y iT|zi,c i,θ)=
T  
t=1
f (yit|zit,y it−1,c i,θ). (4)
As a next step, the unobserved term ci has to be integrated out









which is not diﬃcult because ci ∼N(α0 + α1yi0 + α2¯ zi,σ2
a). Assuming in addition that (1)




  T  
t=1
Φ((2yit − 1)(θ1yit−1 + θ2zit + c))
 
h(c|zi,y i0,α)dc, (6)
where the integral can be evaluated using Gauss-Hermite quadrature (see Stroud/Secrest
(1966) or Butler/Moﬃt (1982)). Estimates of θ =( θ1,θ 2)a n dα =( α1,α 2)c a nt h e n
be obtained by standard conditional maximum-likelihood methods, i.e. by maximizing
logL(θ,α)=
 N
i=1 logfi (θ,α) (see e.g. Wooldridge (2002b)).
3.2 Fixed eﬀects estimation
One drawback of the correlated random eﬀects model of the preceding section is that it as-
sumes a rather speciﬁc relationship between the explanatory variables zi and the unobserved
eﬀect ci. Although this relationship does not necessarily have to be speciﬁed as above, i.e.
as a linear function of the time averages ¯ zi (this has been done to save degrees of freedom),
it could be restrictive in the given context. In order to avoid this restriction, a ﬁxed eﬀects
logit approach can be employed (see Honor´ e/Kyriazidou (2000)).
For the dynamic ﬁxed eﬀects logit model, it is assumed that
yit =1{θ1yit−1 + θ2zit + ci + eit ≥ 0} (7)
7as before, but with
P (yit =1 |zi,y it−1,c i)=P (yit =1 |zit,y it−1,c i)=
exp(θ1yit−1 + θ2zit + ci)
1+e x p( θ1yit−1 + θ2zit + ci)
. (8)
The ﬁrst equation in (8) is the strict exogeneity assumption again, which rules out feedback
from the current poverty status to future values of the explanatory variables, while the second
equation implies that the eit’s follow an i.i.d. logistic distribution, independent of zi,c i and
yi0. In addition, it is assumed that the initial observation yi0 has an arbitrary probability
distribution given zi and ci
P (yi0 =1 |zi,c i)=p0 (zi,c i). (9)
To estimate this model, Honor´ e/Kyriazidou (2000) observed that for observations 1 ≤
t<s≤ T − 1
P (yit =1 ,y is =0 |zi,c i,y it + yis =1 ,z it+1 = zis+1,y it−1,y is−1,y it+1,y is+1) (10)
is independent of ci and that it can be calculated as
pts (θ)=
exp(θ1 (yit−1 − yis+1)+θ1 (yit+1 − yis−1)1{s − t>1} + θ2 (zit − zis))
1+e x p( θ1 (yit−1 − yis+1)+θ1 (yit+1 − yis−1)1{s − t>1} + θ2 (zit − zis))
. (11)
It follows that
P (yit =0 ,y is =1 |zi,c i,y it + yis =1 ,z it+1 = zis+1,y it−1,y is−1,y it+1,y is+1)=1 −pts (θ), (12)
and that both
P (yit =0 ,y is =0 |zi,c i,y it + yis =1 ,z it+1 = zis+1,y it−1,y is−1,y it+1,y is+1) = 0 (13)
and
P (yit =1 ,y is =1 |zi,c i,y it + yis =1 ,z it+1 = zis+1,y it−1,y is−1,y it+1,y is+1)=0 . (14)







1{yit + yis =1 }1{zit+1 = zis+1}log
 
pts (θ)





8Note that (15) is as a standard problem of M-estimation (for details on M-estimation and
on how an estimate of the variance-covariance matrix of the parameters can be computed,
see e.g. Wooldridge (2002b)).
A diﬃculty of the ﬁxed eﬀect estimator is that typically only very few observations
contribute identifying information. Firstly, only pairs of observations t,s contribute to the
criterion function where at the same time the poverty status changes, i.e. yit + yis =1 ,a n d
where the vector of exogenous characteristics in the period after t and s is the same, i.e.
zit+1 = zis+1. Secondly, from (11), θ1 and θ2 can only be identiﬁed if there are observations
for which in addition yit−1  = yis+1 (or yit+1  = yis−1 for s−t>1) and zit  = zis. Together with
the ﬁrst requirement, the latter condition requires in particular that for their eﬀects to be
identiﬁed, the exogenous variables have to change over time, but not too fast. If the zit are
continuous, the strong equality constraints may be relaxed in a local smoothing procedure
(see Honor´ e/Kyriazidou (2000)). Unfortunately, this is not an option here as most of the
covariates (e.g. employment status and household composition) are of a discrete nature.
3.3 Pooled estimation
Both the random eﬀects and the ﬁxed eﬀects approach are based on the strict exogeneity
assumption, which may be questionable in the given context. A simple (but ineﬃcient) alter-
native that avoids the strict exogeneity assumption is a pooled estimator (see e.g Wooldridge
(2002b)). Let
yit =1{θ1yit−1 + θ2zit + ci + eit ≥ 0} (16)
with
ci = α0 + α1yi0 + α2¯ zi + ai, (17)
and eit ∼N (0,1),a i ∼N (0,σ2
a) as in the random eﬀects model. Multiplying the original






























2 can therefore be estimated by running a probit model on the pooled observa-
tions (however, standard errors have to be adjusted to account for the fact that observations
are dependent at the level of the individual.) An important drawback of the pooled approach
is that the amount of unobserved heterogeneity σ2
a cannot be determined.
The reason why the pooled estimator is able to consistently estimate the
state dependence parameter θ1 even in the presence of explanatory variables that
are not strictly exogenous is that it makes no assumption on the joint distributi-










2 ) are the true parameters and
f(yit|zit,y it−1,δa) is the correctly speciﬁed conditional density of yit,t h e nδa,∗ maximi-
zes E(logf(yit|zit,y it−1,δa)) for all t (this follows from the Kullback-Leibler informati-










yields consistent estimators of δa,∗ (see Wooldridge
(2002b)).
3.4 A Model with feedback eﬀects
If there are feedback eﬀects, the use of the dynamic random eﬀects probit model as well
as that of the ﬁxed eﬀects logit model is questionable. While the pooled estimator is in
principle capable of identifying the state dependence parameter even in the presence of
feedback eﬀects, it will not be informative with respect to the existence and the direction of
these feedback eﬀects. Moreover, it is ineﬃcient and cannot identify the share of unobserved
heterogeneity σ2
a/(1 + σ2
a). The aim of this section is therefore to develop an econometric
model which explicitly allows for feedback eﬀects from poverty status to future employment
decisions and household composition. The model will not only provide consistent estimates
of the state dependence eﬀect and the amount of unobserved heterogeneity, it will also shed
light on the existence and direction of possible feedback eﬀects, disclosing possible additional
channels of causal transmission from past to future poverty.
Let5 yit denote individual poverty status as before, and let wit and vit indicate whether
5The following is based on the general framework described in Wooldridge (2000).
10individual i is employed and whether he (the empirical analysis will focus on prime-age males
only) is living together with other persons. This will be a partner and possibly children in
most cases. Then, under assumptions analogous to those made in the case of the random
eﬀects probit model, the joint density of yi1,...,y iT,w i1,...,w iT,v i1,...,v iT given exogenous
variables zi,i n i t i a lv a l u e syi0,w i0,v i0 and an individual-speciﬁc eﬀect ci can be written as




f (yit|zit,w it,v it,y it−1,w it−1,v it−1,c i,θ)
·f (wit|zit,v it,y it−1,w it−1,v it−1,c i,γ)




Φ((2yit − 1)(θ1zit + θ2wit + θ3vit + θ4yit−1 + θ5wit−1 + θ6vit−1 + ci)) (20)
·Φ((2wit − 1)(γ1zit + γ2vit + γ3yit−1 + γ4wit−1 + γ5vit−1 + γ6ci)) (21)
·Φ((2vit − 1)(β1zit + β2yit−1 + β3wit−1 + β4vit−1 + β5ci)), (22)
where the individual-speciﬁc eﬀect now also includes the inﬂuence of the initial values of
employment status and living arrangements, i.e.
ci = α0 + α1yi0 + α2wi0 + α3vi0 + α4¯ zi + ai. (23)
Note that the additional equations for employment status (21) and household compo-
sition (22) also include lagged poverty experience, capturing possible feedback eﬀects from
poverty to employment status and to whether the individual lives alone. Such feedback ef-
fects may reﬂect detrimental eﬀects of poverty on the morale of the individual, leading to
lower employment probabilities, or on the stability of marriages or cohabitative relationships,
increasing the probability of a household split. A negative eﬀect of poverty on employment
status may also be the result of adverse incentives (the so-called poverty trap), where high
marginal tax and transfer burdens prevent individuals from taking up a job.
Note that the three equations are not truly simultaneous, as e.g. current poverty does
not enter the employment equation. It is well known that truly simultaneous systems of
qualitative outcomes are logically inconsistent (see Maddala (1983), section 5.7). Equations
(21) and (22) also control for state dependence eﬀects in employment behaviour and living
arrangements, and for possible correlations between employment status, living arrangements
11and the unobserved time-invariant determinants of poverty status ci. Estimation of the model
is analogous to the single-equation random eﬀects probit model, i.e. the individual-speciﬁc
eﬀect ci has to be integrated out ((19) takes the place of (4) in (5)).
A limitation of the model is that it does not allow for serial correlation in the idio-
syncratic error terms. Serial correlation in dynamic binary response models can in principle
be taken account of using simulation methods (see Hajivassiliou/Ruud (1994) and Hyslop
(1999)). However, given the multiple equations structure of the model, it would be exceedin-
gly diﬃcult to model serial correlation in the given case. Moreover, the results for welfare
participation in Chay/Hyslop (2000) suggest that controlling for serial correlation makes
little diﬀerence in the given context. Interestingly, the pooled estimator is also robust to
serial correlation. A comparison of the pooled estimates with the ones of the feedback model
(see below) also indicates that serial correlation is not an important issue in the application
considered here.
3.5 Other methods
Alternative methods for estimating dynamic binary choice models with regressors that
potentially violate the strict exogeneity assumption have recently been proposed by Ho-
nor´ e/Lewbel (2002) and Arellano/Carrasco (2003). In Honor´ e/Lewbel (2002), estimation is
based on the assumption that there exists a continuous regressor that is independent of the
individual speciﬁc eﬀect and the error term, conditional on the other regressors. As both
assumptions are clearly violated in the given context (all regressors are discrete and likely
to be correlated with the individual eﬀect), this estimator is not suited for the application
pursued here. Arellano/Carrasco (2003) propose a semi-parametric estimator based on the
cell-averages of all possible time-paths of the regressors up to a given period. However, in
an application with a moderate to large number of regressors and many time periods as it
is considered here, this usually leads to a large number of empty cells and requires the use
of trimming methods.6 Their approach is therefore not further pursued here.
6In their empirical illustration, Arellano/Carrasco (2003) consider an example with only two regressors.
123.6 Estimating average partial eﬀects
In order to assess the magnitude of state dependence and feedback eﬀects, it is useful to
calculate average partial eﬀects. In the given context, average partial eﬀects show the im-
pact of a change in an explanatory variable on one of the endogenous variables, i.e. on the
risk of experiencing poverty, the probability of being employed or the probability of living
together with other persons, averaged over the distribution of the other characteristics in
the population. For example, in the model with feedback eﬀects the average partial eﬀect of
lagged poverty status (the state dependence eﬀect), is given by
APE = E
 
P (yit =1 |zi,w it,v it,y t−1 =1 ,w it−1,v it−1,y i0,w i0,v i0)
−P (yit =1 |zi,w it,v it,y t−1 =0 ,w it−1,v it−1,y i0,w i0,v i0)
 
,
where the expectation is over all characteristics indexed by i. This average partial eﬀect can
be consistently estimated by
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(superscript a denotes again the original parameter estimates multiplied by (1 + ˆ σ2
a)−1/2).
Average partial eﬀects in the single-equation random eﬀects model and in the pooled
model are estimated analogously. As the relationship between the explanatory variables zi
and the individual eﬀect ci remains unspeciﬁed in the ﬁxed eﬀects model, no partial average
eﬀects are available in this approach. This is a serious drawback of the ﬁxed eﬀect approach,
as the magnitude of the state dependence eﬀect (and that of other variables) cannot be
determined (this was pointed out by Wooldridge (2002a)).
134 Data
The empirical analysis in the following section is based on a sample taken from the German
Socio-Economic Panel (GSOEP). The GSOEP is a representative panel study for Germany
which was started in 1984 for West Germany and which was extended to East Germany after
reuniﬁcation of the country in 1990 (for a more detailed description, see SOEP Group (2001)
and Haisken-DeNew/Frick (2003)). As most of the mechanisms discussed in the introduction
apply to individuals who are in principle attached to the labour market, the analysis focuses
on men aged between 18 and 65 years. The sample used here consists of 2427 East and West
German men (including foreigners) and covers the years 1991 to 2001.
The variables that were treated as potentially being endogenous were individual poverty
status, individual employment status and whether the individual lived in a one-person-
household. Individual poverty status was derived from monthly net household income using
a standard equivalence scale (the so-called OECD-scale, see e.g. Atkinson et al. (1995)).
Applying this scale, household incomes were ﬁrst divided by the square-root of household
size. The result of this calculation was then attributed to each household member as a
measure of his or her personal disposable income. Following a conventional standard for
Germany,7 the poverty line was set to one half of the mean of these equivalized personal
incomes in each year. The poverty line was calculated for the whole population (including
children), while for the ﬁnal sample only men aged 18 to 65 years were selected.
The deﬁnition of employment status included part-time work, although this concerned
only a very small fraction of the sample. Household composition was captured by a binary
variable indicating whether the individual lived alone or together with others, which was
in most cases a partner (married or cohabiting) and possibly children. All other variables
were treated as exogenous. These were in particular variables indicating the highest achieved
educational qualiﬁcations, individual age, nationality, and whether the individual resided in
East or in West Germany. With regard to the highest achieved educational qualiﬁcations,
individuals were grouped into three categories. These were (i) individuals holding a university
degree, (ii) individuals who had Abitur (equivalent to a high-school degree) or who underwent
vocational training (Lehre), and (iii) all others.
7See e.g. Bundesministerium f¨ ur Arbeit und Sozialordnung (2001).
14Although the model with feedback eﬀects described in the previous section is identiﬁed
without exclusion restrictions (due to its recursive structure), additional exogenous variables
were included in the employment equation and in the equation for household composition.
These were the regional vacancy ratio by federal state (Bundesland) and a dummy indicating
whether the individual’s last job was terminated by ﬁrm closure for the employment equation,
and the share of prime-aged men living together with other persons (estimated from the
sample) and a dummy for church attendance in the equation for household composition.
The idea of the latter variables was to pick up societal trends in living arrangements (which
are exogenous to the individual) and personal attitudes towards marriage. To the extent that
these variables are exogenous, they provide additional variation for the identiﬁcation of the
dynamic interplay between poverty status and the other two endogenous variables.
5 Empirical results
The presentation of the empirical results proceeds in two steps. In a ﬁrst step, the results of
the single-equation models are presented and discussed. In a second step, these results are
then contrasted with the estimates of the model with feedback eﬀects.
The ﬁrst column of table 1 shows the results for the single-equation correlated ran-
dom eﬀects model. The estimate for the state dependence eﬀect is sizable and statistically
signiﬁcant. It suggests that even after controlling for diﬀerences in observed and unobserved
characteristics, past poverty experience was connected to a higher future poverty risk. The
eﬀects of other characteristics were in line with prior expectations. For example, being gain-
fully employed signiﬁcantly reduced the poverty risk in a given period. Living together with
others also reduced the risk of being poor, but this eﬀect was not as strong as that of being
employed. An explanation for the latter eﬀect is that individuals who live together with
others beneﬁt from household economies-of-scale and from the earnings of their partners or
other household members.
— Table 1 about here —
As expected, having a university degree reduced the poverty risk, but this eﬀect was
15not statistically signiﬁcant. However, the estimates for the correlated part of the random
eﬀect (lower part of table 1) suggest that holding a university degree was connected to
unobserved characteristics that strongly reduced the probability of being poor. In a similar
way, unobserved characteristics connected to employment status were associated with lower
poverty risks. The estimates in the upper part of table 1 further show the age proﬁle of
poverty. The poverty risk decreased with age, where again part of this eﬀect was due to
unobserved characteristics that were correlated with age (see lower part of the table). Finally,
non-German nationality, living in East Germany and low income in the initial year 1991 were
associated with higher poverty rates (as the characteristic nationality was practically time-
invariant, it was only included in the correlated part of the permanent eﬀect).
The second column of table 1 show the corresponding results for the ﬁxed eﬀects
model. Again, a statistically signiﬁcant eﬀect of past on future poverty is found. However,
because of the unmodelled error variance in this model (the permanent individual eﬀect ci
and its variance was left unspeciﬁed), the magnitudes of the coeﬃcients cannot be compared
to the ones of the random eﬀects model. It seems however that relative magnitudes are
similar. Apart from the state dependence eﬀect most of the estimates are rather imprecise,
which stems from the fact that typically a very small number of observations identiﬁed
the respective eﬀect (see the discussion in section 3). For example, the eﬀect of the East
Germany dummy was identiﬁed by a mere thirteen observations that were contributed by
only six individuals.
The last column of table 1 presents the results for the pooled model. Apart from the
state dependence parameter, which was estimated about twice the size of that in the random
eﬀects model, the estimated eﬀects are remarkably similar to the ones in the random eﬀects
model. (The coeﬃcients of the two models are directly comparable since both models were
normalized to have an error variance of one.) As discussed above, the estimates of the pooled
model are a-priori more reliable than those of the random eﬀects model as they are robust to
a violation of the strict exogeneity assumption. The fact that the eﬀects are so similar except
for the one for state dependence might therefore indicate that the random eﬀects estimate
might be biased due to a violation of the no-feedback assumption.
This question can be addressed using the model with feedback. The estimation results of
this model are shown in table 2. Column 1 of the table displays the coeﬃcients for the poverty
16equation. As in the other models, there were strong and signiﬁcant poverty-reducing eﬀects
of employment and of living together with others. The results also suggest a sizeable and
signiﬁcant state dependence eﬀect, the magnitude of which even exceeded that of employment
(the magnitude of the most interesting eﬀects in terms of average partial eﬀects are discussed
in more detail below). There was also a negative (but smaller) eﬀect of past employment on
current poverty status, which indicates that even after controlling for current employment
status, past unemployment had a detrimental eﬀect on poverty risk, e.g. through worsening
job quality or displaced workers penalties. The eﬀects for the other variables show similar
patterns as in the previous models, although the estimates seem less precise due to the larger
number of estimated parameters.
— Table 2 about here —
The results for the employment equation are given in the second column of table 2.
They suggest that current household composition had a signiﬁcant negative eﬀect on employ-
ment in the sense that men who lived alone were less likely to be non-employed than those
who lived together with others. A possible explanation is that those living alone cannot count
on the ﬁnancial support of other household members and therefore face stronger incentives
to seek employment. The results for the employment equation also provide evidence for si-
gniﬁcant feedback from past poverty to future employment in the form of a strongly negative
eﬀect. This means that past poverty experiences diminished the probability of employment
in future periods, which can be interpreted as evidence for a poverty trap. There was also a
strong state dependence eﬀect in employment behaviour, i.e. even after controlling for other
characteristics, employment in one period led to higher employment probabilities in future
periods. This conﬁrms state dependence eﬀects for unemployment found in other studies, see
e.g. M¨ uhleisen/Zimmermann (1993) and Flaig et al. (1993) for Germany or Arulampalam et
al. (2000) for Britain.
The eﬀects of the other variables on employment were in line with prior expectations.
Higher educational qualiﬁcations were associated with higher employment probabilities and
there was a concave age proﬁle of employment. The decreasing employment probability of
older men can be explained by the wide spread practice of early retirement in conjunction
with an extended period of unemployment beneﬁt receipt. East German men had lower
17employment probabilities than their West German counterparts, which was due to the much
higher unemployment rate in East Germany. On the other hand, there was no additional
explanatory power of the regional vacancy ratio (the number of vacancies divided by the
number of unemployed, disaggregated by federal states). By contrast, the instrument of ﬁrm
closure was highly signiﬁcant. If the last job of the individual was terminated by ﬁrm closure,
this signiﬁcantly diminished the probability of employment in later periods. As ﬁrm closure
is exogenous to the individual, inclusion of this variable shifts employment independently of
the individual factors aﬀecting poverty and thus provides additional variation to identify the
eﬀect of employment on poverty status. Finally, the results at the bottom of table 2 show
that the unobserved individual-speciﬁc factors determining poverty were negatively related
to the probability of being employed.
Column 3 of table 2 presents the corresponding results for household composition.
Again, there was a statistically signiﬁcant feedback eﬀect of poverty on household compo-
sition. A poverty experience in one period led to a higher probability of living in a one-
person-household in the next period. This can be interpreted as evidence that low income
increased the probability of a household-split. It is interesting to see that this was the eﬀect
of low income and not of unemployment, as the corresponding coeﬃcient for employment
was small and statistically insigniﬁcant. There was also a strong state dependence eﬀect in
household composition, which reﬂects the costs of household dissolution especially in the
case of married couples. The age-proﬁle of household composition was concave, with higher
probabilities of living alone at young and at older ages. Living arrangements also seemed
strongly related to societal trends, as the extremely large estimate for the eﬀect of the aggre-
gate living-with-others ratio suggests. Church attendance, which can be seen as a proxy for
personal attitudes towards marriage, was also positively related to the probability of living
with others, but the corresponding eﬀect was much smaller than that of aggregate trends.
Finally, there was a negative association between the the probability of living alone and the
unobserved individual-speciﬁc determinants of poverty.
How large are these eﬀects in percentage points? Table 3 presents the most interesting
estimates expressed as average partial eﬀects. According to the random eﬀects estimates,
being poor increased the poverty risk in the next period by roughly 8 percentage points. By
contrast, the pooled model estimated this eﬀect as approximately 24 percentage points. The
18pooled estimate was very similar to the estimate from the feedback model, which implied
that poverty in the previous period increased the poverty risk in the next period by 22
percentage points. The fact that the pooled model and the model with feedback yielded very
similar results and that these results were diﬀerent from those of the potentially misspeciﬁed
random eﬀects model suggests that the random eﬀects estimates were biased.
— Table 3 about here —
Table 3 also shows the aggregate transition probabilities, which can be interpreted
as unconditional estimates without controlling for diﬀerences in observed or unobserved
characteristics. According to these estimates, those poor in the previous period had a poverty
risk that was 45 percentage points higher than that of individuals who were not poor in the
previous period. In conjunction with the estimates of the pooled or the feedback model this
implies that about half of poverty persistence was due to state dependence, while the other
half was due to persistence in observed and unobserved characteristics.
The rest of the table shows the eﬀects for the other variables. Being employed reduced
the poverty risk by almost 14 percentage points and individuals who lived together with
others had about six percentage points lower poverty rates than those who did not, other
things being equal. Employment probabilities were reduced by two percentage points on
average if the individual in question lived together with others, and by almost four percen-
tage points if the individual was poor in the previous period. There was considerable state
dependence in employment status, with individuals who were employed in the previous pe-
riod having 17 percentage points higher employment probabilities than those who were not.
Finally, poverty in the previous period reduced the probability of living together with others
by one percentage point and increased it by roughly 88 percentage points if the individual
already lived together with others in the previous period.
6 Conclusion
This paper considered the question of whether there are causal eﬀects from past poverty
experience on future poverty status, employment status and household composition. The
19results suggest that even after controlling for observed and unobserved diﬀerences, experi-
encing poverty was associated with an increased poverty risk in future periods. Moreover,
there is evidence that experiencing poverty had a detrimental eﬀect on future employment
behaviour and household cohesion. The estimates thus provide evidence that poverty experi-
ences can be associated with processes of demoralization, depreciation of human capital and
with incentive problems, increasing the probability that individuals who become poor will
remain so for an extended period of time. There is also evidence that poverty experiences
may reduce household cohesion, indicating that low income strains marriages and cohabi-
tative relationships. Future research should address in more detail through which channels
these eﬀects work and what their relative importance is.
The paper also highlighted the role of the strict exogeneity assumption in estimating
dynamic binary response models with unobserved heterogeneity. The existence of feedback
eﬀects of poverty status on future values of the variables that are used to explain the poverty
risk of a given period makes the use of models based on the strict exogeneity assumption
questionable. Based on the framework of Wooldridge (2000), this paper therefore developed a
dynamic model of poverty which explicitly allowed for such feedback eﬀects. The estimation
results suggest that in the presence of feedback eﬀects, models based on the strict exogeneity
assumption may yield biased results.
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Table 1. Single equation dynamic binary response models for individual poverty status
(standard errors in parentheses)
random eﬀectsa ﬁxed eﬀectsb pooled modelc
Dependent variable: individual poverty status
lagged poverty status 0.6582 (0.0500) 1.2361 (0.1563) 1.3956 (0.0567)
employed -0.7087 (0.0451) -1.5849 (0.1979) -0.7182 (0.0569)
living w. others -0.3694 (0.0882) -0.7857 (0.3621) -0.3134 (0.0945)
university degree -0.1543 (0.1401) -0.7072 (0.7170) -0.0911 (0.1433)
Abitur or Lehred 0.0123 (0.0754) 0.3337 (0.4122) 0.0167 (0.0720)
26 - 35 years -0.0538 (0.0778) -0.1524 (0.3509) -0.0263 (0.0887)
36 - 45 years -0.1075 (0.1009) -0.1674 (0.4781) -0.0350 (0.1081)
46 - 55 years -0.1839 (0.1280) -0.3130 (0.6391) -0.0499 (0.1328)
56 - 65 years -0.2583 (0.1481) -0.3577 (0.7751) -0.1479 (0.1555)
East Germany 0.3877 (0.2290) 0.5572 (0.7366) 0.1742 (0.2299)
Initial condition
poverty status in 1991 0.6065 (0.0639) 0.3903 (0.0601)
Random eﬀect (time averages)
employed -0.4020 (0.0924) -0.2742 (0.0954)
living w. others 0.0864 (0.1266) 0.0883 (0.1235)
university degree -0.4179 (0.1484) -0.4108 (0.1538)
Abitur or Lehred -0.1428 (0.1023) -0.0950 (0.0940)
26 - 35 years 0.5746 (0.1957) 0.4895 (0.1724)
36 - 45 years 0.5454 (0.1819) 0.4490 (0.1657)
46 - 55 years 0.3835 (0.2080) 0.2503 (0.1907)
56 - 65 years 0.3655 (0.2224) 0.2542 (0.2092)
non-German nationality 0.3505 (0.0682) 0.3203 (0.0596)
East Germany -0.0988 (0.2344) 0.0606 (0.2348)
constant 1.1815 (0.1689) -1.3682 (0.1398)
Source: GSOEP, 1991 - 2001, balanced sample of 2427 prime-aged males (18 to 65 years).
a Coeﬃcients were rescaled by (1 + ˆ σ2
a)−1/2 to ensure comparability with pooled model.
The estimate of σa was ˆ σa =0 .7397 with estimated standard error 0.0414.
b See Honor´ e/Kyriazidou (2000).
c Standard errors account for clustering of observations at individual level.
d High-school degree and/or vocational training.
25Table 2. Joint dynamic model of poverty status, employment status and household composition
(standard errors in parentheses)
Dependent variables
poverty status employed living w. others
Endogenous variables
employed -1.1887 (0.0530)
living w. others -0.5800 (0.1266) -0.3221 (0.1147)
Lagged endogenous variables
lagged poverty status 1.3578 (0.0504) -0.4627 (0.0549) -0.2172 (0.1091)
lagged employment status -0.1509 (0.0525) 1.8627 (0.0411) 0.0375 (0.1157)
living w. others, lagged 0.0627 (0.1198) 0.1027 (0.1108) 3.4314 (0.0839)
Exogenous variables
university degree 0.1148 (0.1236) 1.6386 (0.1207) 0.0924 (0.2120)
Abitur or Lehrea 0.1311 (0.0683) 0.7946 (0.0692) -0.0709 (0.1000)
26 - 35 years 0.0871 (0.0755) 0.1917 (0.0616) 0.4065 (0.0712)
36 - 45 years 0.0380 (0.0948) 0.2888 (0.0892) 0.6030 (0.0719)
46 - 55 years -0.0552 (0.1300) 0.1323 (0.1291) 0.6536 (0.0685)
56 - 65 years -0.2708 (0.1573) -0.6979 (0.1538) -0.5256 (1.3060)
East Germany 0.1277 (0.1922) -0.3223 (0.2017) 0.0363 (0.0913)
regional vacancy ratio 0.0020 (0.0025)
ﬁrm closed down -1.0976 (0.0650)
living w. others ratiob 4.9080 (1.6197)
church attendancec 0.2120 (0.0750)
Initial condition
poverty status in 1991 0.1949 (0.0516)
employment status in 1991 0.3988 (0.0458)
living w. others in 1991 0.3018 (0.1260)
Random eﬀect (time averages)
university degree -0.5054 (0.0985)
Abitur or Lehrea -0.2970 (0.0764)
26 - 35 years 0.1942 (0.1019)
36 - 45 years 0.1833 (0.1049)
46 - 55 years 0.1334 (0.1426)
56 - 65 years -0.0988 (0.1665)
non-German nationality 0.1289 (0.0437)
East Germany 0.1359 (0.1939)
constant -1.2175 (0.1084)
σa 0.3645 (0.0279)
loading factor γ6 -1.0602 (0.1135)
loading factor β5 0.3765 (0.2719)
Source: GSOEP, 1991 - 2001, balanced sample of 2427 prime-aged males (18 to 65 years).
a High-school degree and/or vocational training.
b Sample fraction of individuals who live with others.
c At least once a month.
26Table 3. State dependence and feedback eﬀects
(average partial eﬀects in percentage points, evaluated for 2001)
Dependent variables
poverty status employed living w. others
Raw transition probabilities
lagged poverty status 0.4515a
Random eﬀects probit
lagged poverty status 0.0793b
Fixed eﬀects logit
lagged poverty status - c
Pooled probit
lagged poverty status 0.2426b
Model with feedback eﬀects
employed -0.1365b
living w. others -0.0623b -0.0207b
lagged poverty status 0.2223b -0.0367b -0.0110b
lagged employment status -0.0128b 0.1669b 0.0017
living w. others, lagged 0.0050 0.0073 0.8877b
Source: GSOEP, 1991 - 2001, balanced sample of 2427 prime-aged males (18 to 65 years).
a Estimate of P(yit =1 |yit−1 =1 )− P(yit =1 |yit−1 =0 ) .
b Underlying coeﬃcient signiﬁcant at 5 % level.
c Average partial eﬀect cannot be calculated.
27